Immanuel Kant, whose roots go back directly to Aristotle, defined the domain of Academic Philosophy for over two centuries.
‘Thought’ proffered Immanuel Kant ‘is cognition by means of conception’.
What’s a ‘Conception’? That sounds like a difficult idea with more syllables. Let’s start with ‘Concept’.
A ‘Concept’ says the Dictionary, is a: ‘a General Notion or Idea; a Conception’.
Great. So what’s an ‘Idea’? The Dictionary says it’s a: ‘Thought, Conception or Notion.’
We’ll, OK. So what’s a ‘Conception’? The Dictionary says it’s a: ‘Notion, Idea, Concept’. [Dictionary.com. Check it out.]
Cognition is a concept. A Concept is that which is ‘conceptually differentiable’. But ‘conceptually differentiable’ is itself a concept.
A concept has a public understanding while ‘conception’ is just a private view. Yet concept is for you a conception and conception becomes a concept in the dictionary, unchanged regardless of who looks at it.
Concept; Conception; Concept of Conception; Conception of Concept. All Concepts; or are they Conceptions?
What is the ‘Orangeness’ in an Orange?
How do you miraculously, unhesitatingly, repeatedly manage to identify an Orange?
What is common between a sliced and a peeled Orange? A ripe and a rotten Orange? A nibbled Orange and a fresh one?
A picture of an Orange, the sound ‘Orange Juice’, the taste of Orange pop, the smell of Orange peel, the touch of Orange pip, the letters ‘O R A N G E’, on a page. The negation: ‘Not-Orange’.
Orangeness is an idea, a concept. A thought.
‘I don’t exactly know what Orangeness is, Professor, but I sure know how to pick an Orange. Or do I?’